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COMMENT 
"PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL" IN MARYLAND: 
AN ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH 
In Maryland, it is well settled that the veil of a corporate entity 
may be pierced only to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount 
equity. This test, formulated to balance the policy of limited 
shareholder liability with the interest of serving justice, has pro-
duced disparate results. This comment surveys the tests em-
ployed by other jurisdictions, reviews and criticizes the policies 
and application of the Maryland standard, and advocates the 
adoption of a more equitable approach in veil piercing cases - a 
"many factors" analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Piercing the corporate veil,! or disregarding the corporate entity, is 
a concept with which American courts have struggled for many years.2 
A variety of tests have been employed by courts to determine whether a 
situation warrants the piercing of the corporate veil. 3 These different 
tests have led to a confusion in policy and an inconsistency in results 
among the various courtS.4 While many jurisdictions consider a number 
1. Piercing the corporate veil is defined as the "judicial process whereby [a] court will 
disregard [the] usual immunity of corporate officers or entities from liability for 
corporate activities .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Luck-
enbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920); Marr v. Postal 
Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940); Carozza v. Federal 
Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (rev. perm. ed. 1983) 
(a general statement of the piercing concept and summary of the varying caselaw); 
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES § 146 (3d ed. 1983) (a concise background of the piercing concept and 
summary of the relevant caselaw). 
With regard to federal courts, no general federal rule for piercing the corporate 
veil has been adopted, primarily because state substantive law applies under choice 
of law principles. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a general 
discussion of piercing the corporate veil in federal courts, see Comment, Piercing the 
Corporate Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAC. 
L.J. 1245 (1982); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under 
Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982). 
3. See infra notes 20-86 and accompanying text. 
4. An application of the Maryland test in two similar situations demonstrates the in-
consistency in results. Compare Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 
Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975) (corporate veil not pierced where assets of one corpo-
ration were transferred to other corporations to evade a legal obligation) with Co-
landrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480 (corporate veil pierced where 
assets of one corporation were transferred to other corporations to evade a legal 
obligation), cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). 
In both of these cases, the Maryland courts applied the same test for determin-
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of factors in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil,s the Maryland 
courts have steadfastly held that a piercing of the corporate veil is war-
ranted only to prevent fraud, or to enforce a "paramount equity."6 This 
comment considers the possible inequities resulting under existing Mary-
land law due to the strict application of these principles. The discussion 
begins with an overview of the concept of piercing the corporate veil, 
followed by a survey of the various tests espoused in decisional law. Af-
ter this general background, the comment focuses on Maryland's ap-
proach, examining its underlying policies and possible . inequities. 
Finally, the comment concludes with a suggested approach for the Mary-
land courts; an equitable approach that considers many factors in situa-
tions where the corporate veil is at issue. 
II. "PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL"-THE CONCEPT 
The corporate entity, while generally recognized as being separate 
and distinct from its shareholders,7 does not always insulate its share-
holders from personal liability. 8 Frequently, a plaintiff or other claimant 
will seek to have the corporate entity disregarded and liability imposed 
upon the shareholders of the corporation. This circumstance may arise 
in situations involving corporations and their individual owners,9 parent 
and subsidiary corporations,1O employee-labor union cases, II and even 
medicare situations. 12 Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine 
available to creditors as well as parties injured by a corporation whose 
ing whether to pierce the corporate veil. The results were different despite the ex-
tremely similar fact patterns of the cases. See infra text accompanying notes 125-42. 
5. See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text. 
6. Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 238, 131 A. 332, 338 (1925) 
(first Maryland case to use the term "paramount equity"); see also Starfish Condo. 
Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Bart Arconti & 
Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975); Dixon v. Process 
Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978). 
7. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 13 (2d ed. 1965); 13A W. FI,.ETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6213 (rev. perm. ed. 1961); 1 H. 
OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 10 (1958); F. POWELL, PARENT & SUB-
SIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1 (1931). 
8. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 14 (2d ed. 1965). 
9. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1976); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967); Weisser v. Mursam Shoe 
Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942). 
10. See Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 
(1983); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); 
see also F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 6, at 8-34 (discussion of many characteristics 
that are important in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in the context 
of parent/subsidiary corporations). For a discussion of practical arguments relating 
to piercing the corporate veil in parent/subsidiary cases, see Posner, The Rights of 
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976). 
11. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610 (D. 
Me. 1977), (piercing analysis used to determine whether a parent corporation is 
bound by a subsidiary's union contracts), affd sub nom. United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union v: T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978). 
12. See United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. & Rehab. Center, 
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separate existence they question. The goal is to have the shareholders 
held personally liable for either contractual obligations purportedly en-
tered into by the corporation, or for tortious injuries to a plaintiff where 
the corporation is alleged to have been the tortfeasor. Where the plaintiff 
is able to demonstrate the presence of certain factors 13 with respect to a 
particular corporation, the corporate veil may be pierced, but not with-
out hesitancy. 
Conflicting policy considerations have made courts hesitant to 
pierce the corporate veil. On one hand, there is the strong policy of al-
lowing limited liability for shareholders in order to promote capital 
growth and investment. 14 On the other hand, there is the competing in-
terest of serving justice in a particular situation where upholding the the-
ory of limited liability would be inequitable. IS The clash between these 
considerations has resulted in the absence of any uniform standards to be 
applied in any given case. Accordingly, courts are often inconsistent in 
delineating which factors are dispositive when confronted with a veil 
piercing case. 16 
III. VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Although several theories have been specifically designated, courts 
frequently decide the issue of piercing the corporate veil without stating 
precisely the theory on which the decision restsP Moreover, where spe-
cific theories are mentioned by a court, often the names of the various 
theories are used as if they are synonomous. 18 While the names may be 
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Normandy House Nursing 
Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1977). 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 60-86. 
14. See N. LAlTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 11-12 (2d ed. 1971); Dobbyn, A 
Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 185, 
185 (1971); see also Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 84, 21 S.W. 531, 
532 (1893) (forming a corporation invites the investment of capital which encour-
ages trade). . 
15. See Dobbyn, supra note 14, at 185; see also United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator 
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (corporation will be looked upon as a 
legal entity unless that entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, 
protect fraud, or defend crime). 
16. See infra notes 20-80 and accompanying text. 
17. Rather than specifying a certain theory for determining whether to pierce the corpo-
rate veil, many courts have merely listed situations whereby one corporation may 
become a mere agent, instrumentality, alter ego, tool, or department of another cor-
poration. See International UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 416 F. Supp. 1267 (D. 
Kan. 1976); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. 
Ark. 1951); State ex rei. Porterie v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co., 191 La. 163, 184 So. 
711 (1938); A.W. Fiur Co. v. Ataka & Co., 71 A.D.2d 370, 422 N.Y.S.2d 419 
(1979). 
18. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234-38 (2d Cir. 1960) (court used the 
term alter ego several times but actually applied the instrumentality theory); Na-
tional Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo.) 
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confusing, it is clear that certain factors must be present regardless of the 
theory applied. 19 
A. Agency Theory 
According to general principles of agency law, for a principal to be 
held liable for the acts of his agent, it must be shown that there was 
authority for the agent to act. 20 This authority may arise in three ways: 
(1) express;21 (2) implied;22 or (3) apparent. 23 
While it is sometimes said that a corporation is merely an agent of 
its shareholders,24 if this were true then the shareholders would always 
incur liability, providing authority could be shown for the corporation's 
acts. This, of course, would frustrate the policy behind the theory of 
limited liability,25 and afford no protection to shareholders. 
There are, however, cases where corporate owners have been held 
liable for the corporation's acts solely based on principles of agency 
law.26 In Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty CO.,27 the court held that 
a subsidiary corporation (Darling Stores, Ltd.)' acted as an agent for its 
parent corporation (Darling Stores Corp.), an undisclosed principal, in 
the negotiation of a lease arrangement. 28 The subsidiary was an assignee 
of a lease of property that was owned by the plaintiff, Young Realty 
Company.29 The property was then subleased to the parent corporation 
by the subsidiary. Subsequently, the lease was abandoned and the plain-
tiff sued the parent. In imposing liability upon the parent, the court 
(court treated instrumentality and alter ego theories as synonomous), affd, 341 
F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1964). 
With respect to the use of such labels, one commentator asserts that statements 
indicating that certain acts make the corporation the shareholder's "alter ego" or 
"instrumentality" are meaningless. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. 
REV. 979, 990 (1971). 
19. For a concise review of factors that courts have found sufficient to warrant piercing, 
see Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 371, 374-75 (1981). 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957). 
21. /d. § 26 (express authority created where principal expressly gives agent authority 
to act through written or spoken words). 
22. /d. (implied authority created where, due to circumstances, agent reasonably be-
lieves he has authority to act). 
23. /d. § 27 (apparent authority created where principal makes manifestation to third 
party that agent has authority to act). 
24. See Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 576, 230 P. 633, 635 (1924). 
25. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
26. Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941); Morgan v. 
Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete, 247 Miss. 863, 157 So. 2d 772 (1963); c/ Ace Dev. 
Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366-67, 76 A.2d 566, 570 (1950) (court, while refus-
ing to pierce the corporate veil because of the lack of fraud on the defendant's part, 
did recognize that agents cannot hide behind the corporate shield when they have 
been acting in a conspiracy). 
It has been suggested by one commentator that in those cases where the agency 
theory is used to pierce the corporate veil, it is actually the instrumentality theory 
that the courts are employing. F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 21, at 89. 
27. 121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941). 
28. /d. at 117. 
29. /d. at 113. 
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noted that it is "uniformly held [by Iowa courts] that the corporate entity 
of a corporation may be disregarded where it is organized and controlled, 
and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, 
agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation."30 
The lack of clear delineation between the affairs of the parent and 
subsidiary is one circumstance where liability may be imposed under the 
agency theory. Another possible basis for liability arises when an indi-
vidual acting for a subsidiary is also an agent of the parent. 31 In this 
situation, an argument may be made that the individual was acting on 
behalf of the parent rather than the subsidiary.32 It is therefore impor-
tant that the individual's status be clearly stated when he acts. 
The presence of an agency relationship between a parent and subsid-
iary corporation does not automatically indicate a basis for piercing the 
corporate veil. These agency relationships will be valid so long as neces-
sary distinctions between the parent and subsidiary are preserved.33 It 
has been urged that an application of strict agency principles to piercing 
cases would "largely destroy the protection afforded stockholders by 
incorporation. "34 
B. Instrumentality Theory 
The instrumentality theory3S focuses on the amount of control exer-
cised in a given situation. The following elements trigger liability under 
the instrumentality theory: (1) control or complete domination over the 
fiscal, policy, and business practices regarding the transaction in question 
such that the corporate entity has no separate mind, will, or existence of 
its own; (2) use of such control to commit a fraud or other wrong; and 
(3) injury or unjust loss proximately caused by the use of such control. 36 
Thus, in determining whether one corporation is a ,mere instrumentality 
of another, or whether a corporation is a mere instrumentality of a share-
holder,37 the element of control is important. 
The courts have applied the instrumentality theory primarily in situ-
ations where the plaintiff is seeking to hold a parent corporation liable for 
the acts of its subsidiary. An application of the instrumentality theory is 
found in National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp.38 In Na-
30. Id. at 116 (emphasis supplied). 
31. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 991-93. 
32.Id. 
33. /d. 
34. F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 22, at 94. 
35. Professor Powell was the first to formulate this theory. Id. §§ 5-6. 
36. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76, ajJ'd, 272 
N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936); F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 5. 
37. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (lOth Cir. 1940); Brown v. Magrande Compania 
Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1968); Lowendahl v. Baltimore & 
O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 158,287 N.Y.S. 62, 76-77, ajJ'd, 272 N.Y. 360,6 N.E.2d 56 
(1936). 
38. 238 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Mo. 1964). 
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tional Bond, the plaintiff sought damages from General Motors (G.M.) 
for transactions involving the purchase of conditional sales contracts for 
the sale of motor vehicles. 39 These sales contracts were entered into by 
the plaintiff with the Lincoln Park Buick Company (Lincoln Park), a 
G.M. dealership. The plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil of Lin-
coln Park, and impose liability upon G.M. based on the following "con-
trol" factors: (1) G.M. controlled all the voting stock of Lincoln Park; 
(2) Lincoln Park's Board of Directors was controlled by G.M.; (3) G.M., 
through its Motors Holding Division, provided the initial capital for Lin-
coln Park; (4) all accounting procedures used by Lincoln Park were 
G.M. procedures; (5) G.M. supervised the liquidation of Lincoln Park; 
(6) the minutes of the Lincoln Park Board meetings indicated that they 
were dominated by G.M.; and (7) a Board Director, who also served as 
President of Lincoln Park, claimed that the Board meetings were con-
trolled by G.M. Board members.40 Despite these facts, the court found 
that the actual existence of the dealership (Lincoln Park) as a separate 
entity was maintained.41 The court held that the elements required by 
the instrumentality theory42 were not satisfied,43 notwithstanding the ex-
ercise of considerable control by G.M. over Lincoln Park. 
Control is not gauged merely by the amount of capital stock owned; 
instead, the inquiry is whether there is complete dominion over the finan-
cial matters, policies, and business practices of the corporation.44 Of 
course, the control aspect in the context of the instrumentality theory has 
little meaning where sole shareholder corporations are involved. In such 
situations, there will be complete dominion exerted over the fiscal and 
business practices, yet absent unusual circumstances, such control will be 
insufficient to pierce the corporate vei1.45 
39. Id. at 249. 
40. Id. at 254-55. 
41. Id. at 258. There was evidence of separate books and premises, as well as employ-
ees. Additionally, Lincoln Park purchased vehicles from G.M., paying cash on de-
livery. For all intents and purposes, the actual businesses of the two companies 
were separate and distinct. There was little intermingling between the two corpora-
tions as far as the formal requisites of the corporate entity were concerned. Id. at 
254. 
42. Id. at 256-58. 
43. Id. at 258. The National Bond court explicitly determined that the corporate veil of 
Lincoln Park should not be pierced because of the facts of this particular case. 
There, plaintiff relied upon the guaranty of Lincoln Park to safeguard its lien upon 
certain cars. With regard to this specifically, the court noted that G.M.'s Board of 
Directors had no personal knowledge that the plaintiff's liens against Lincoln Park 
were not being protected. Because these matters were solely within the administra-
tive functions of Lincoln Park's President, G.M. could not be held liable. Id. The 
court did note, however, that because of the degree of control that G.M. generally 
exerts over dealerships such as Lincoln Park, situations could arise where piercing 
the corporate veil of such dealerships would be appropriate. Id. 
44. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 154,287 N.Y.S. 62, 72-73, affd, 
272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936). 
45. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265 (La. 
App. 1969). For examples of "unusual circumstances," see Iron City Sand & 
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Unusual circumstances, or an element of unfairness, generally must 
be present in addition to control to warrant piercing the corporate veil. 
As one court stated, "[s]omething more [than control] is needed, such as 
fraud, illegality, or wrongdoing which produced the injury or complaint, 
otherwise the corporate entity will stand."46 
C. Alter Ego Theory 
Closely resembling the instrumentality theory is the alter ego the-
ory.47 While the elements of these theories are slightly different, de-
cisions founded on either theory tend to exhibit one prominent 
characteristic: a loss of individuality of the corporation.48 The elements 
of the alter ego theory have been stated as: (1) a unity of interest and 
ownership causing the individuality of the corporation to cease; and (2) 
allowing the observance of the separate existence would approve a fraud 
or promote an injustice.49 As with the instrumentality theory, the alter 
ego theory requires more than a mere showing that one individual or 
corporation owns all the stock of another corporation. 50 
The alter ego theory was applied in Marr v. Postal Union Life Insur-
ance Co., 51 where the plaintiff trustees claimed that the defendant corpo-
rations, Postal Union Life Insurance Company (Insurance) and Postal 
Underwriters Incorporated (Underwriters), were "alter egos" of each 
other. 52 Underwriters, the corporation that issued a promissory note to 
plaintiffs for the sale of hotel property, 53 was a subsidiary of Insurance. 
When Underwriters defaulted on the note, and plaintiffs learned of Un-
derwriters's relationship to Insurance, they sought to pierce Underwrit-
ers's corporate veil. In applying the alter ego theory, the Marr court held 
Gravel Div. v. West Fork Towing Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. W. Va. 1969) 
(corporation operated so that it was always insolvent); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 
563,227 A.2d 552 (1967) (shareholder conducted business in such a way as to cause 
confusion between individual and corporate finances). 
46. Brown v. Magrande Compania Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Va. 
1968). 
47. See N. LATIIN, supra note 14, § 18, at 86-87. 
48. See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Fisser v. 
International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. 
Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940). The alter ego theory, like the instru-
mentality theory, has the element of control as its basic characteristic. See infra text 
accompanying notes 49-50. For this reason, it also should have no application in 
the context of sole shareholder corporations. If applied in those situations, corpo-
rate veils of virtually all sole shareholder corporations theoretically would warrant 
piercing. 
49. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940). For 
decisions employing the alter ego theory, see Leavard Petroleum Ltd. v. Mene 
Grand Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1976); Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev. 
Corp., 421 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
50. G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963); Chichester v. 
Polikowsky, 231 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1955). 
51. 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940). 
52. Id. at 677, 105 P.2d at 653-54. 
53. Id. at 676, 105 P.2d at 652. 
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that the circumstances warranted piercing Underwriters's corporate 
veil. 54 The court found that the stock of Underwriters had never been 
issued, that the Vice-President of Underwriters, who also served on the 
Board of Directors, was paid a salary by Insurance, that all active work-
ers promoting the interests of Underwriters were paid employees of In-
surance, that Insurance owned the building where both corporations 
were located, and that a common PBX board was used for handling the 
telephone service for both corporations. 55 Accordingly, the Marr court 
concluded that the defendant corporations lacked individuality, and to 
recognize the fiction of their separate existences would be tantamount to 
approving a fraud or promoting injustice. 56 
D. The "Many Factors" Approach 
Unlike the aforementioned theories, the "many factors" approach is 
a suggested analysis that has no uniform set of standards. Instead, this 
approach proposes the examination of the factors discussed below, and a 
weighing of the equities in each case to determine whether to pierce the 
corporate veil. 57 
Using this type of analysis, courts have eliminated the problem of 
confusing the various piercing theories. In this respect, the importance 
of the presence of the elements of the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" 
theories no longer exists. Likewise, it is insignificant whether a court 
labels its rationale for piercing as being derived from either theory. While 
under this "many factors" approach there are no clear-cut standards to 
be applied, decisional law that has used this approach, without labeling it 
as such, suggests certain factors that should be present to impose liabil-
ity.58 It is unclear which factors are the most important in determining 
whether to disregard the corporate entity. Similarly, the number of fac-
tors required to be present is also unresolved. In all instances, however, 
where courts adopted this equitable approach and pierced the corporate 
54. [d. at 680, 105 P.2d at 656. 
55. [d. at 677-78, 105 P.2d at 654-55. Additional facts influencing the court's decision 
were that Insurance arranged to have $4,100 advanced to Underwriters to consum-
mate the purchase of the hotel property from plaintiffs, that Underwriters agreed to 
execute a $90,000 trust deed in favor of Insurance upon the hotel property, and that 
the taxes were paid on behalf of Insurance by its president. [d. at 680, 105 P.2d at 
656. Concerning the evidence, the court stated: 
The foregoing recital of the evidence convinces us that there were here 
present all the necessary elements to constitute an alter ego relationship 
between two corporations, namely, (I) control of one by the other; (2) that 
one was but the mere conduit of the business of the other; (3) that recogni-
tion of the separate existence of the Underwriters would sanction a fraud 
and permit oppression and injustice. 
[d. at 680, 105 P.2d at 656. 
56. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 680, 105 P.2d 649, 656 
(1940). 
57. This basic idea was proposed by Professor Latty although not named as such. See 
E. LAITY, SUBSIDIARIES & AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936). 
58. See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text. 
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veil,59 at least two of the factors discussed below were present. 
Concededly, under a "many factors" analysis, the determination 
whether to pierce the corporate veil rests on a subjective analysis by the 
court, and as with any other subjective analysis, some inconsistencies in 
results may remain. It is suggested, however, that adoption of this ap-
proach would go far to eliminate inconsistencies in the application of the 
various piercing standards, provided that the factors listed below are 
thoroughly analyzed. 
1. The Undercapitalization Factor 
Many courts consider the adequacy of the corporation's capitaliza-
tion to be an important factor in piercing cases.60 Inadequate capitaliza-
tion, which may prevent a corporation from meeting its prospective 
liabilities, suggests that the corporation's promoters never intended it to 
have a separate existence. Where undercapitalization occurs, it seems 
logical to pierce the corporate veil. This, however, is not always the case. 
Although inadequate capitalization may increase the probability that a 
court will pierce the corporate veil, this factor alone is seldom disposi-
tive,61 and problems are inherent in its application. 
One problem associated with the undercapitalization factor is differ-
entiating between underlying contract and tort actions. Inadequate or 
nominal capitalization should not be a factor in contract cases because 
the parties have voluntarily chosen to deal with each other. Absent some 
form of misrepresentation or fraud by a corporation, a creditor who vol-
untarily enters into a contract with the corporation should be treated as 
having assumed the risk of the adequacy of the corporation's capitaliza-
tion. Hence, in contract actions, there is authority for the proposition 
that inadequate capitalization alone is not a basis for piercing the corpo-
rate veil. 62 
Inadequate capitalization in tort actions, however, presents a differ-
ent situation. Tort actions generally arise from nonconsensual transac-
tions, and as such warrant treatment different from the contract cases. 
Because of the nature of tort actions, the argument that the plaintiff or 
claimant "assumed the risk" by dealing with a nominally capitalized cor-
poration is without merit. One commentator, noting inadequate capitali-
59. Some courts have taken this approach without specifically labeling it the "many 
factors" approach. See Hollander v. Henry, 186 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
341 U.S. 949 (1951); Kingston Dry Dock Co.-v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 
F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929). 
60. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1976); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Stone v. 
Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 
267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920). 
61. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960); Harris v. Curtis, 8 
Cal. App. 3d 837,841,87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-18 (1970). 
62. Carlismo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Bartle v. Home 
Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955). 
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zation as an important factor to be considered 10 tort actions, 
summarized the policy as follows: 
[A]n inadequately capitalized corporation in a risky business in 
effect transfers the risk of loss to innocent members of the gen-
eral public. While the corporation need not be capitalized to 
ensure that all conceivable liabilities will be discharged, a cor-
poration should be reasonably capitalized in light of the nature 
and risks of the business. 63 
Two other significant issues arise in the consideration of a corpora-
tion's capitalization: first, how to measure the capitalization; and second, 
when in time the capitalization is to be measured. With respect to mea-
suring the adequacy of the corporation's capitalization, some courts 
merely arrive at a capitalization figure that they consider reasonable. 64 
Commentators have suggested that courts should either apply a reason-
able man standard,6s or use a comparative analysis of companies in the 
same industry.66 In determining when the capitalization of the corpora-
tion should be measured, courts have viewed the measurement date at 
the time of incorporation,67 as well as later in time when mismanagement 
has occurred.68 
2. The Abuse of Formalities Factor 
The abuse of, or failure to maintain, corporate formalities is another 
factor that courts consider in determining whether to pierce the corpo-
rate veil. 69 The abuse of formalities issue requires analysis in two specific 
respects: (1) the observance offormalities between parent and subsidiary 
corporations, or between individual shareholders and a corporation; and 
(2) whether the underlying action lies in contract or tort. 
In situations involving an abuse of formalities between parent and 
subsidiary corporations, one or more of the following factors may be 
63. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 988; see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 
N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). 
64. These courts often determine the amount without stating the basis upon which their 
decision rests. E.g., Automatriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 
306 P.2d 1 (1957) (court merely looked at the numerical figures and without any 
discussion, determined the original contribution to capital to be inadequate); Clare-
mont Press Publishing Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813, 10 Cal. Rptr. 214 
(1960) (where a printer advised the defendant that $10,000 of initial capital was 
necessary to fund the publication of a newspaper, the court accepted the printer's 
advice without question and made no further inquiry). 
65. See Symposium on the Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345, 369 (1957). 
66. See N. LATIIN, supra note 14, § 15, at 77-78. 
67. See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Ham-
ilton, supra note 18, at 986 ("[i]nadequate capitalization is measured at the time of 
the formation of the corporation"). 
68. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-
86 (4th Cir. 1976) (court discussed both initial and ongoing financial responsibility 
as factors for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil). 
69. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 989-94. 
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present: (1) a commingling of the assets of both corporations; (2) a lack 
of stock issuance by one of the corporations; (3) a failure to maintain 
separate corporate records; and (4) a failure to hold directors or share-
holders meetings for each corporation. 70 
The same factors may be present in the context of a corporation and 
its single owner. In this situation, the individual owner's funds are often 
commingled with the corporation's finances. 7 ! Regardless of whether the 
abuse of formalities occurs in the parent/subsidiary context or in the in-
dividual shareholder/corporation context, the policy behind the formali-
ties requirement remains constant. Corporate owners should not impair 
the interests of other parties by carrying their unity of interests too far. 72 
Commentators have suggested that the formalities factor should 
yield different results depending upon whether the action is in contract or 
tort.73 In contract actions, the corporate entity should not be disre-
garded regardless of any abuse of formalities. 74 This position, like the 
argument for the undercapitalization factor, is premised on the notion 
that when a third party enters into a contract with a corporation or a 
corporate owner, he does so voluntarily and at his own risk.7s Therefore, 
in contractual situations where an abuse of formalities is present, the 
third party has the ability to determine whether the corporate entity is 
separate from its owner, and accordingly should have determined with 
whom he dealt. 
Where the underlying action lies in tort, however, the plaintiff can-
not be said to have assumed the risk76 of dealing with the corporation.77 
70. See Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975) (transfer of 
funds by one corporation to another without the formalities of a loan, or having 
common bank account may be an abuse); Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 
382 A.2d 893 (the parent and subsidiary corporations had the same directors, the 
parent owned all the subsidiary's equipment, no separate board meetings were held, 
and the parent hired all of the subsidiary's employees), cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 
(1978); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 989-94 and cases cited therein (concise 
discussion of abuse of formalities). 
71. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So. 2d 
210 (La. App. 1977); Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 
340 A.2d 225 (1975). 
72. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 1.10 (1971 & Supp. 
1984). 
73. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 983; Note, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Con-
tract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1967); Note, Should Shareholders be Personally 
Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967). 
74. Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpora-
tion Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 554. 
75. [d. 
76. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). 
In its most basic sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in 
advance, has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obli-
gation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a 
known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. 
[d. at 480 (emphasis in original). 
77. Note, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 
76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1193 (1967). 
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The plaintiff has rarely had prior dealings with the corporation-tort-
feasor, and usually will not even learn of such abuse of formalities until 
well after the injury. 
While the suggested distinction between contract and tort actions is 
logical, it is one most courts have failed to make,18 Generally, an abuse 
of formalities alone is insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil, 
regardless of the basis for the underlying action. 79 
3. The Control Factor 
The determination of control under the "many factors" approach is 
much the same as that made under the instrumentality and alter ego 
theories.8o In short, there must be pervasive control exercised by the 
shareholders over the corporation.8! The unity of ownership and inter-
est, and complete domination by the shareholders over the corporation's 
finances, policies, and business practices are factors evidencing pervasive 
control. 82 As with the presence of undercapitalization and an abuse of 
formalities, the presence of control alone is insufficient to warrant a 
piercing of the corporate veil. 
4. The Unfairness Factor 
In many situations, a basic element of unfairness is present, and is 
another factor considered by many courts in determining whether to 
pierce the corporate veil. 83 An estoppel situation often arises when a 
78. These distinctions have been proposed by commentators rather than by courts. See 
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 988; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
79. While the abuse of formalities factor generally can be applied to all corporations, it 
is necessary to note at least one situation where this factor should not be used. In 
Maryland, a statutory close corporation may be formed pursuant to Title 4 of the 
Maryland Annotated Code. Where a statutory close corporation is involved, such 
formalities as a board of directors and regular meetings may be eliminated. MD. 
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-302, -402 (1975). While the abuse of formalities 
factor should not be used in this context, it is important to note that in such situa-
tions the need to pierce the corporate veil may be even greater than where no Title 4 
election has been made. Where there has been a Title 4 election, and the corpora-
tion has elected to eliminate such formalities as meetings and a board of directors, it 
is unlikely that a lack of those formalities may lead to the merging of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders into one. Although the lack of formalities technically is 
not an "abuse" due to the statutory provisions, an innocent third party may easily 
be misled into believing that he was dealing with an individual rather than a 
corporation. 
80. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. 
81. See Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); G.E.J. 
Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Fisser v. International 
Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 
(1967). 
82. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. The presence of these factors in a 
sole shareholder corporation cannot be said to constitute pervasive control, and as 
such should not be considered in determining whether to pierce its corporate veil. 
83. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 
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corporation or a corporate owner makes a misrepresentation to the detri-
ment ofa third party.84 In such C8Ses, the element ofunfaimess, coupled 
with undercapitalization, pervasive control, or an abuse of formalities, 
requires piercing the corporate veil because of the obvious inequity in 
upholding the corporate owners' limited liability. 
Misrepresentations frequently occur in the form of promises or 
guarantees made by a controlling shareholder.8s They also occur where 
a third party is led to believe that he is dealing with a particular individ-
ual rather than a corporation,86 where the capitalization of a corporation 
is misrepresented,87 or where a third party is tricked into dealing with 
the corporation.88 
IV. MARYLAND'S APPROACH TO PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL 
A. Historical Background 
In 1831, the concept of piercing the corporate veil was alluded to in 
The Bellona Company's Case. 89 In Bellona, the chancellor discussed, in 
dictum, the defendant's allegation that the plaintiff lacked corporate ca-
pacity.90 Although the claim could not properly be heard in the proceed-
ing to dissolve an injunction,91 the chancellor nevertheless expounded 
upon the implications of the defendant's assertions for future reference, 
"when the Court shall be called on for its judgment upon such a case. "92 
The chancellor stated, in effect, that a corporation composed of many 
stockholders could be dissolved if one incorporator obtained possession 
(4th Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 
1962). 
84. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); 
Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942). 
85. See Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,689 
(4th Cir. 1976) (shareholder promised to pay for goods personally if corporation did 
not, and supplier relied on his promise); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 
F.2d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 1962) (parent corporation assured plaintiff that it would 
back subsidiary's obligations). 
86. Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 430, 308 P.2d 428,430 (1957). 
87. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 688-89 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
88. See Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1942). 
89. 37 Md. 435 (1831). The Bellona Gunpowder Company of Maryland had obtained 
an injunction against the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company prevent-
ing the construction of a road that Bellona claimed would encroach upon its prop-
erty. In the present proceeding, the defendant railroad company sought to have the 
injunction dissolved. Id. at 435. 
90. Id. at 439. 
91. The plaintiff's lack of corporate capacity was deemed by the chancellor to be a new 
matter in avoidance of the plaintiff'S claim since it was not properly responsive to 
the bill. Id. 
92.Id. 
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of all the corporation's stock.93 In such a case, if one acted "under the 
disguise of being a body politic, to protect himself from a personal re-
sponsibility for his debts,"94 that conduct could constitute fraud. The 
implication of Bellona is that the corporate entity may be disregarded in 
situations where all of its corporate stock is owned by one person. This, 
however, is not the law in Maryland.95 This theory was cited with ap-
proval in only one case after Bellona,96 and was subsequently dis-
credited.97 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first espoused the requirements 
for piercing the corporate veil in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Con-
crete Pile CO.,98 and these requirements have remained virtually un-
changed. The court stated that the corporate entity could be disre-
garded, and the owners of the capital stock and the corporation treated 
as one, "when there is fraud, or some good ground for its action, in fur-
therance of the ends of justice. "99 
In Bethlehem Steel, a foreman for the Raymond Concrete Pile Com-
pany was killed by a backward moving train while he was constructing a 
railroad trestle. lOO Because the steel company owned nearly all of the 
stock of the railroad company,101 the plaintiff sought to impose liability 
upon the former. The court found that the two companies actually were 
separate organizations despite the ownership of the stock by the steel 
company. Further, it reasoned that because there was neither fraud, nor 
any attempt to evade the law, the corporate existence would not be 
disregarded. 102 
As in Bethlehem Steel, much of the early Maryland case law demon-
strates unsuccessful attempts by claimants to impose individual liability 
upon shareholders when the shareholders owned all, or nearly all, of the 
93. Id. The chancellor considered that such conduct might be a fraudulent evasion of 
the law. Id. at 439-40. 
94. Id. at 440. 
95. See infra notes 103-35 and accompanying text. 
96. Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 A. 534 (1886) (dictum) ("In Bellona 
. . . the Chancellor says, the ownership by one person of all the stock of a private 
corporation aggregate virtually dissolves the corporation. For the time being it cer-
tainly does suspend corporate action .... " Id. at 434, 5 A. at 537.). 
97. Dollar Cleansers & Dyers, Inc. v. McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932). 
We are not prepared to hold under the present state of the law in relation 
to corporations that under no circumstances could a corporation, in which 
all of the stock was held by one person, make a valid mortgage to that 
person. The expressions in Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 A. 
534, which would lead to that conclusion . . . cannot now be ac-
cepted .... 
Id. at 108, 161 A. at 161; see also State v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 F. 51, 77 (D. 
Md. 1914) ("The acquirement by a single individual or corporation of all the stock 
of another corporation does not suspend the corporate life. "). 
98. 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279 (1922). 
99. Id. at 81, 118 A. at 284. 
100. Id. at 72, 118 A. at 280. 
101. Id. at 81, 118 A. at 284. 
102. Id. at 82, 118 A. at 284. 
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corporation's capital stock. 103 In all instances, the factor of sole owner-
ship, in the absence of fraud, was insufficient to warrant the disregarding 
of the corporate entity. 104 
In 1925, the Maryland court of appeals first introduced the term 
"paramount equity."105 While maintaining "fraud" as an actionable ba-
sis for piercing the corporate veil, the court added this elusive language: 
"or to enforce a paramount and superior equity."106 
B. Current Test 
It is now well settled in Maryland that the corporate veil will be 
pierced only to prevent fraud, or to enforce a "paramount equity."107 
The Maryland courts have applied this test whether liability is sought to 
be imposed upon an individual shareholder,108 or a parent corpora-
tion.109 Likewise, the standards are unyielding whether the underlying 
action be in con tract 11 0 or tort. 111 
In Starfish Condominium Association v. Yorkridge Service Corp., 112 
the most recent Maryland case discussing the issue of piercing the corpo-
rate veil, an attempt was made to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary 
103. See William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 165 A. 463 (1933); 
Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925); see also 
Cotten v. Tyson, 121 Md. 597, 89 A. 113 (1913) (requirements for disregarding 
corporate entity not set forth); Pott & Co. v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 A. 592 
(1897) (same). 
104. William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 16 A. 463 (1933); Car-
ozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925). 
105. Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 238, 131 A. 332, 338 (1925). 
106. [d. 
107. Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693,458 A.2d 805 (1983); 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975); 
Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md. 
App. 671,402 A.2d 134, cert. denied, 286 Md. 748 (1979); Colandrea v. Colandrea, 
42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979); Dixon v. Process 
Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978); United 
Elec. Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd. Partnership, 36 Md. App. 
70, 373 A.2d 42 (1977). 
108. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. V. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 309-11, 340 A.2d 225, 
234-35 (1975); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633-34, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970); 
Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366-69,76 A.2d 566, 570-71 (1950); Fuller 
v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 684, 402 A.2d 134, 142, cert. denied, 286 Md. 748 
(1979); Colandrea V. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 427-28, 401 A.2d 480, 484, cert. 
denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). 
109. See Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 713, 458 A.2d 
805, 816 (1983); Dixon V. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 654-55, 382 A.2d 893, 
899, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978). 
110. Starfish Condo. Ass'n V. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693,458 A.2d 805 (1983) 
(contract action); Fuller V. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671,402 A.2d 134 (same), cert. 
denied, 286 Md. 748 (1979); Colandrea V. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 
480 (same), cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). 
111. Damazo V. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970) (action for tortious interfer-
ence); Bethlehem Steel CO. V. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279 
(1922) (negligence action). 
112. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 V\83). 
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of a federal savings and loan association. 113 The Maryland court of ap-
peals refused to hold the association liable for its subsidiary's obligations, 
not only because there was no indication of fraud, but also because there 
was no "identification of an equity which require[d] enforcement, and 
which [was] paramount to the ordinary expectation of limited liabil-
ity .... "114 It thus appears from Starfish that the policy of upholding 
limited liability outweighs the policy of promoting justice in Maryland. 
Furthermore, the Starfish court employed the principle of "paramount 
equity," yet as in previous decisions, the court never clearly defined the 
term. IIS 
With respect to the term "paramount equity," the court in Dixon v. 
Process Corp., 116 alluded to a definition: 
Unless the party against whom the application of the doctrine 
is sought has been blameworthy "of some unconscientious, in-
equitable or fraudulent act of commission or omission upon 
which another has relied and been misled to his injury, the doc-
trine will not be ~pplied."117 
An illustration of the court enforcing a "paramount equity" is found 
in United Electric Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd. 
Partnership.118 In United Electric, the plaintiff corporation United Elec-
tric Supply Company (United Electric) was solely owned by one Joe Pe-
novich, who also was president and sole owner of a licensed electric 
company. After a third party unlicensed company contracted to do elec-
trical work for Greencastle Gardens, Penovich gave the unlicensed com-
pany permission to use his licensed company's name on the electrical 
permit to meet county requirements. In return for the use of his com-
pany's name, Penovich secured a promise that the unlicensed company 
would purchase all necessary supplies from United Electric. 119 The use 
of the licensed company's name for the purpose of obtaining a permit 
was clearly in violation of a regulatory statute. 120 Ultimately, United 
Electric was not paid for the materials it supplied because of work im-
properly performed by the subterfuge company, and sought to enforce a 
mechanics lien against Greencastle Gardens. 121 The court, relying on 
113. Id. at 713, 458 A.2d at 816. 
114. Id. at 714, 458 A.2d at 816. 
115. For opinions in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered the concept 
of "paramount equity," but provided no genuine definition, see Bart Arconti & 
Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975); Damazo v. 
Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. 
Ry., 164 Md. 448, 165 A. 463 (1933); Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 
Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925). 
116. 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978). 
117. Id. at 658, 382 A.2d at 901 (citations omitted). 
118. 36 Md. App. 70, 373 A.2d 42 (1977). 
119. Id. at 73, 373 A.2d at 44. 
120. /d. at 72:373 A.2d at 44. 
121. Id. at 74, 373 A.2d at 45. 
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the violation of the regulatory statute as sufficient grounds for piercing 
the corporate veil, refused to treat the Penovich owned United Electric as 
a separate corporate entity from the Penovich owned licensed electric 
company. The court treated the actions of both corporations as if Pe-
novich had been acting as an individual. The corporate entity was ig-
nored in this case because it was "necessary to enforce the public policy 
of a regulatory statute."122 Further, the court stated: "Corporate veils 
were not intended to provide false fronts as conveyances for pecuniary 
gain made from conduct that is statutorily proscribed."123 
Not only is it unclear precisely what constitutes a "paramount eq-
uity," but determining what constitutes fraud may be equally as difficult. 
Most recently, the Maryland court of special appeals defined fraud as "a 
scienter tort consisting of the representation of a material fact that is 
false, deceptive and injurious."124 In deciding the issue of fraud in pierc-
ing cases, the Maryland appellate courts reached different results in Bart 
Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc. 125 and Co/andrea v. Co/an-
drea,126 despite similar fact patterns. 
Bart Arconti, decided in 1975 by the Maryland court of appeals, in-
volved a breach of contract action brought by a general contractor 
(Ames-Ennis) against a subcontractor (Bart Arconti & Sons). Named as 
defendants in the action were Bart Arconti & Sons, its sole shareholders 
Bart and George Arconti, and two controlled affiliated corporations, G & 
L Construction Company and Atlas Tile and Terraza, Inc. 127 Because of 
the contractual dispute, Bart and George Arconti took precautions to 
minimize the assets of Bart Arconti & Sons. Specifically, Bart Arconti & 
Sons, the most profitable of the three corporations owned by the Arcon-
tis, ceased to operate and was permitted by its owners to become dor-
mant. 128 All business which normally would have been performed by 
Bart Arconti & Sons was thereafter directed to and completed by the two 
affiliated corporations. Moreover, the assets of Bart Arconti & Sons were 
122. [d. at 80 n.5, 373 A.2d at 48 n.5. The court reasoned that Penovich, acting through 
his licensed electric company, had "soiled" his hands by making the illegal agree-
ment with the third party unlicensed company. United Electric's claim relied upon 
that illegal contract. The court reasoned that Penovich's behavior, if not overtly 
fraudulent, "smacked thereof sufficiently," such that his soiled hands were also the 
hands of United Electric. United Electric's claim was therefore precluded under the 
equitable doctrine of unclean hands. [d. at 80, 373 A.2d at 47. 
123. [d. at 80, 373 A.2d at 47. Even though the violation of a statute was enough to 
warrant piercing in United Electric, thereby making the determination of fraud un-
necessary, it would seem that absent such a violation, the approach would be two-
tiered: (1) determine if fraud is present; and (2) if fraud is lacking, look to see if 
there is the need to enforce a "paramount equity." 
124. Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 685, 402 A.2d 134, 142, cert. denied, 286 Md. 
748 (1979). 
125. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975). 
126. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). 
127. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 303-04, 340 A.2d 225, 
230-31 (1975). 
128. [d. at 309, 340 A.2d at 233-34. 
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transferred to the affiliated corporations. 129 
The court also noted that the construction equipment owned by the 
three companies was commingled, all three corporations operated out of 
the same place of business, the same workmen were shared by each cor-
poration, all the stock of the three corporations was owned by Bart and 
George Arconti, certain loans were made to the Arcontis by Bart Ar-
conti & Sons, and certain insurance policies were transferred to the for-
mer by the latter. 130 Despite these findings, the court would not pierce 
the corporate veil of Bart Arconti & Sons, nor impose liability upon its 
individual owners or the affiliated corporations. \31 The trial court, which 
had pierced the corporate veil, viewed the diversion of the business and 
the commingling of the corporations's assets as merely being an attempt 
to evade a legal obligation. 132 In reversing the lower court's decision, the 
court of appeals stated that it was "[un]aware of any Maryland case 
where, on facts resembling those here, the Court has allowed the corpo-
rate identity to be disregarded merely because it wished to prevent an 
'evasion of legal obligations,' - absent evidence of fraud or similar 
conduct." 133 
In Co/andrea v. Co/andrea,134 a corporation, Cortland Realty, Ltd., 
was formed by Dominic and Carmen Colandrea, then husband and wife. 
Marital problems arose, and ultimately a divorce agreement was reached 
whereby the corporation was sold to Carmen by way of a stock redemp-
tion agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, a substantial portion of the 
redemption price was evidenced by notes that were to be paid to Dominic 
by the corporation in annual installments.135 Three months after the exe-
cution of the stock redemption agreement, Carmen incorporated Cort-
land, Ltd. to divert the residential sales operation from Cortland Realty, 
Ltd. - its most profitable component. 136 Sometime later, the name of 
Cortland Realty, Ltd. was changed to Carmen Management Company, 
Inc. 137 When Dominic failed to receive payment from the corporation, 
he brought suit to pierce the corporate veil, and named as defendants 
Carmen and the two corporations she had formed after the stock re-
demption agreement. 138 The complaint alleged that the business and as-
sets of Cortland Realty, Ltd. had been completely transferred to 
129. Id. at 304-05, 340 A.2d at 231. 
130.Id. 
131. Id. at 313-14, 340 A.2d at 236. 
132. Id. at 309, 340 A.2d at 234. 
133. Id. at 311-12, 340 A.2d at 235. The trial court, in deciding to pierce the corporate 
veil, relied exclusively on H. BRUNE, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW & 
PRACTICE § 371 (rev. ed. 1953), which states that a corporate veil can be pierced in 
order to prevent evasion of legal obligations. Id. at 434-35. 
134. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). 
135. Id. at 423, 401 A.2d at 482. 
136.Id. 
137. Id. at 424, 401 A.2d at 482. 
138. Id. at 425, 401 A.2d at 483. 
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Carmen's two newly formed corporations,139 just as the assets were 
transferred in Bart Arconti. In Colandrea, however, the court of special 
appeals disregarded the corporate entity and imposed individual liability 
upon Carmen Colandrea. l40 
The distinction between the two cases appears to be the factual evi-
dence presented. In Colandrea, a legal obligation was undertaken by the 
defendant in her capacity as officer/director of the corporation to make 
payment to the plaintiff, but, as the court of special appeals found, at the 
time this agreement was made, the defendant had no intention of honor-
ing the obligation. 141 Thus, the new corporations, formed specifically to 
avoid liability for this agreement, were part of the defendant's fraudulent 
scheme. The fraud finding, though sound in Co/andrea, was based upon 
the defendant's own admission in a deposition that she had no intention 
of repaying the obligation. Had the defendant not disclosed her fraudu-
lent intention, the Co/andrea court may not have made a finding of fraud, 
provided the defendant could have demonstrated sound business reasons 
for the creation of the corporations. 142 By comparison, the court of ap-
peals in Bart Arconti found no fraud even where events similar to those 
in Colandrea were undertaken to evade a legal obligation. Had there 
been an admission in Bart A rconti such as the one in Colandrea, the court 
139. Id. at 424, 401 A.2d at 482. 
140. Id. at 432-33, 401 A.2d at 486-87. 
141. Id. The Co/andrea court stated the following requirements for fraud, which must be 
satisifed by clear and convincing proof: 
(1) a material representation of a party was false, (2) falsity was known to 
that party or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indiffer-
ence to the truth as to impute knowledge to him, (3) the misrepresentation 
was made with the purpose to defraud (scienter), (4) the person justifiably 
relied on the misrepresentation, and (5) the person suffered damage di-
rectly resulting from the misrepresentation. 
Id. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484 (citations omitted). 
142. The court stated that normally it would not interfere with a trial court's finding of 
"sound corporate reasons." It concluded, however, that there were no sound busi-
ness reasons for the creation of Cortland, Ltd. and Carmen Management Company, 
Inc. Id. at 429, 401 A.2d at 485. Moreover, the court stated: 
Regardless of whether there were sound corporate reasons for the creation 
of the new corporations. . . we think the trial court clearly erred in fail-
ing to consider Mrs. Colandrea's admission in a deposition. . . that at the 
time she signed the agreement on behalf of the corporation, she had no 
intention of paying the notes. 
Id. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485. 
From this analysis, it appears that the court could not have determined fraud 
without the deposition of Mrs. Colandrea. Absent such a deposition, the basis for 
determining fraud would have rested on Mrs. Colandrea's assertion that the "sound 
corporate reason" for the creation of the new corporations was due to the filing of a 
race discrimination suit against Cortland Realty, Inc. While the court of special 
appeals found this statement to be "actionable fraud," id., it conceded that the other 
elements of fraud would also have to be demonstrated by "clear and convincing" 
proof. Since the court determined that the deposition was far more convincing, it 
neglected to make a finding concerning the presence of all elements of fraud with 
respect to Mrs. Colandrea's statement about the race discrimination suit constitut-
ing a "sound corporate reason." Id. 
330 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
might have pierced the corporate veil of Bart Arconti & Sons. Thus, 
absent expressed intentions of fraud, it seems unlikely that the Maryland 
courts will pierce the corporate veil. 
V. DOCTRINAL REFORM FOR "PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL" IN MARYLAND: A SUGGESTED 
APPROACH 
The current law in Maryland for determining whether to disregard 
the corporate entity is unduly narrow, and oftentimes inequitable. Mary-
land courts consistently refuse to pierce the corporate veil for anything 
less than a "cleat and convincing" showing of fraud. 143 The appellate 
decisions appear to consider only the policy concerns behind the theory 
of limited liability, while ignoring the policy of serving justice in a partic-
ular case. l44 A more equitable approach would place equal emphasis 
upon the latter consideration, one which the Maryland courts seem to 
have obliterated. The policy of serving justice in a particular case cannot 
be preserved under the current test of fraud or "paramount equity" be-
cause of the stringent standards for determining fraud, and because of 
concomitant obscurities associated with the term "paramount equity." 
Accordingly, the standards enunciated by the Maryland courts should be 
revamped to take into account the real equities of a given factual 
scenario. 
A. Adoption of the "Many Factors" Approach in Maryland 
Utilizing the various considerations enumerated in the "many fac-
tors" analysis - including factors such as undercapitalization, abuse of 
formalities, control, and unfairness - Maryland courts would be able to 
provide injured claimants with a remedy that at present is not available. 
Although the current Maryland test is stable because it is the accepted 
standard, the elimination of its stringent requirements would help ad-
vance the policy of promoting justice in a particular case. Moreover, the 
adoption of the "many factors" approach would certainly not undermine 
the policy behind limited liability.145 
Under the "many factors" approach, even in the absence of fraud, 
an injured claimant might be entitled to recovery. There may be situa-
tions in which the factors of undercapitalization, control, abuse of 
formalities, and unfairness are present, yet fraud is not. 146 Ip such situa-
tions, it may be equally as equitable to disregard the corporate entity as it 
is where fraud occurs. In addition, demonstrating an element of unfair-
143. See supra note 141. 
144. The only other policy consideration mentioned by Maryland courts has been that of 
enforcing public policy proscribed by a regulatory statute. See United Elec. Supply 
Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd. Partnership, 36 Md. App. 70, 80 n.S, 
373 A.2d 42, 47-48 n.S (1977). 
14S. See supra notes 14-1S and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text. 
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ness without having to demonstrate the elusive ingredient of enforcing a 
"paramount equity," will lead to fewer ambiguities in situations where 
the burden of proving fraud is too great, yet where liability should be 
imposed in order to serve justice in a particular situation. Regardless of 
whether liability is to be imposed upon an individual or upon a parent 
corporation, the decision to pierce the corporate veil should proceed 
upon a finding of more than one of the mentioned factors, and a balanc-
ing of both conflicting policy considerations. 147 
B. Application of the "Many Factors" Analysis to Maryland Decisions 
Applying the "many factors" analysis to several Maryland decisions 
demonstrates the possibility, if not probability, of different results being 
reached under this approach. A brief discussion of three cases where the 
court refused to disregard the corporate veil underscores this point. 
In Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 148 the Maryland 
court of appeals, holding that there was neither fraud present nor a "par-
amount equity" to be enforced, refused to pierce the corporate veil. Ap-
plying the "many factors" analysis to the facts of Bart Arconti, two of the 
previously mentioned factors are evident: control and an abuse of for-
malities. 149 Clearly, pervasive control was exercised by Bart and George 
Arconti over the three companies. ISO Bart Arconti & Sons lost its indi-
viduality as a separate entity when the owners took steps to transfer its 
assets and thus render it dormant. Similarly, all three corporations lost 
their individuality with respect to the types of work in which they were 
engaged, 15l and as such, should not have been allowed to profit from the 
separate entity privilege. 
In addition to the pervasive control present in Bart Acconti, the 
commingling of the construction equipment and other assets constituted 
an abuse of formalities. One dealing with these corporations could easily 
be misled into believing that there was no distinction between the three 
corporations because Bart Arconti & Sons's assets and business had been 
shifted to the two sister corporations. ls2 
The same type of shifting of assets occurred in Colandrea v. Colan-
147. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. The courts should focus on the policy 
that seems to be most important in a particular case; to wit, whether limiting liabil-
ity in a particular circumstance outweighs the policy of "doing justice in a particular 
case," and vice versa. 
148. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975). 
149. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. 
150. Bart Arconti, 275 Md. at 304, 340 A.2d at 231. Not only were Bart and George 
Arconti the only stockholders of the corporations, but they also controlled the day-
to-day management affairs of the businesses. 
151. Id. at 304,340 A.2d at 231. Bart Arconti & Sons's specialties were ceramic tile and 
masonry construction. G & L Construction Company, a sister corporation, special-
ized in masonry construction, while Atlas Tile and Terrazo, Inc., the other affiliate, 
specialized only in ceramic tile. 
152. Concededly, in Bart Arconti there was no such confusion, but this is not to say that 
such conduct could not create confusion in another situation. 
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drea,ls3 yet there, the court pierced the corporate veil. Apparently, any-
thing short of demonstrating actual fraud by way of an admission 154 will 
be insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. In Bart Arconti, there was not 
only the presence of control and an abuse of formalities, but also an ele-
ment of unfairness: the ability of individuals to avoid contractual obliga-
tions by maneuvering assets among corporate bodies. This avoidance 
tactic, in many respects, was similar to that in Co/andrea. It is the ele-
ment of unfairness that needs more consideration by the Maryland courts 
to promote the policy of doing justice in a particular case. If the unfair-
ness factor, a component in the proposed "many factors" approach, had 
been considered in Bart Arconti, Bart Arconti & Sons would not have 
been able to avoid its legal obligations to Ames-Ennis, and therefore, 
Ames-Ennis would have recovered the damages to which it was entitled. 
Following Bart Arconti, the Maryland court of special appeals dis-
cussed piercing the corporate veil in Dixon v. Process Corp. ISS The plain-
tiff in Dixon, alleging a breach of contract, obtained a judgment against 
the parent corporation ("PIM") and attempted to obtain a decree that 
the parent and subsidiary -corporations were one in the same, so as to 
have the judgment collectible from the subsidiary ("TPC").ls6 At all 
times, the plaintiff in Dixon believed he was dealing with only one corpo-
ration: (1) the directors for the corporations were the same; (2) the stock 
of PIM was paid for but not issued; (3) PIM owned all the equipment 
that was used by its subsidiary; (4) PIM hired all of its subsidiary's em-
ployees, rented their offices, operated their payroll, attended to unem-
ployment matters, and managed its affairs; and (5) separate board 
meetings for TPC were never held. 157 These factors indicate the presence 
of control and an obvious abuse of formalities. 
After reviewing the above facts, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland stated: "We think there was legally sufficient evidence to cast 
doubt as to the separate corporate identities of PIM and TPC."IS8 None-
theless, the Dixon court held that the corporate veil could not be pierced 
because there was no showing of fraud or a "paramount equity."ls9 Had 
the "many factors" approach been employed, the doubts expressed by 
the court could and would have dictated that the corporate veil be 
pierced. 
The federal court in the district of Maryland has also applied this 
153. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979); see supra text 
accompanying notes 116-23. 
154. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485. In fact, in no Maryland case 
found to date has the corporate veil been pierced solely to enforce a "paramount 
equity." 
155. 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978). 
156. [d. at 650, 382 A.2d at 897. 
157. [d. at 654, 382 A.2d at 899. 
158. [d. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900. 
159. [d. 
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rigid standard,l60 as illustrated by Gordon v. S.S. Vedalin. 161 In Gordon, 
an individual, Johnson, purchased a vessel, the S.S. Vedalin. The 
purchase was not made in his own name, but rather in the name of a 
corporation, Harold's Trading Post, which Johnson solely owned. 162 Af-
ter Harold's Trading Post defaulted on the payment, an order of resale 
was issued. Pursuant to this resale order, the defaulting first purchaser, 
Harold's Trading Post, was "responsible for all costs in connection with 
the resale, and maintenance of the vessel." 163 When the various expenses 
were not paid, the libelants of the vessel brought suit to have the corpo-
rate veil of Harold's Trading Post pierced and individual liability im-
posed upon Johnson. 164 In support of their argument that the veil should 
be pierced, the plaintiffs in Gordon relied upon the following: (1) the 
corporation was never properly capitalized; (2) there was doubt that cor-
porate formalities, such as the formal issuance of stock and regular cor-
porate meetings, had ever been observed; and (3) the corporation was 
initiated to give Johnson a chance to engage in business that he otherwise 
could not engage in because of outstanding judgments against him. 165 In 
fact, the only indication of Harold's Trading Post's separate existence 
was the filing of its articles of incorporation. 166 The district court de-
scribed the proof of the corporation's separate existence as being "tenu-
ous at best,"167 however, with Maryland law controlling, the court held 
that the corporate veil could not be pierced. 
Using the "many factors" approach, as opposed to the strict Mary-
land requirements, the outcome in Gordon most likely would have been 
different. The district court's finding of the corporation's tenuous sepa-
rate existence would have, in all likelihood, yielded a conclusion that 
recognizing the separateness would be unfair or inequitable; hence, the 
corporate veil would have been pierced. In rendering its decision, how-
ever, the Gordon court was confined to the well settled Maryland law, 
160. See Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1982); Gordon v. S.S. Vedalin, 346 
F. Supp. 1178 (D. Md. 1972); Winand v. Case, 154 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1957); see 
also supra note 2 and accompanying text (law review articles discussing the federal 
court's problems with piercing the corporate veil). 
161. 346 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Md. 1972). 
162. [d. at 1180. 
163. [d. 
164. [d. 
165. [d. at 1181. 
166. [d. This apparently is sufficient to determine the corporate existence. This thought 
was stated with approval by the Dixon court following Gordon. See Dixon, 38 Md. 
App. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900. In Maryland, the acceptance of articles of incorpora-
tion by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation conclusively establishes 
the existence of the corporation as a legal entity. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE 
ANN. §§ 1-205, 2-102(b) (1975). 
167. "Even though the proof of the existence of the corporation as a separate entity and 
not as the mere alter ego of Harold Johnson is tenuous at best, it seems that, under 
Maryland law, the corporate entity cannot be disregarded in this case." Gordon, 
346 F. Supp. at 1181. 
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and thus unable to pierce the corporate veil. 168 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Several theories have been formulated through the years to deter-
mine whether to pierce the corporate veil. Although these theories have 
been given various names by both courts and commentators, certain fac-
tors are repeatedly present and analyzed by the courts. Generally, the 
presence of these factors, coupled with an element of unfairness, provides 
the rationale for a court's decision to pierce the corporate veil. 
Maryland also considers these factors, but in a different manner. 
Specifically, the presence of certain factors coupled with an element of 
unfairness does not justify piercing the corporate veil unless doing so 
would prevent fraud or achieve a "paramount equity." 
Decisional law applying the rigid Maryland requirements demon-
strates that the Maryland courts regard the policy behind limiting liabil-
ity as being tantamount to the policy of promoting justice in a particular 
case. The import of this latter policy concern needs to be reconsidered 
by the Maryland courts in piercing cases. It is submitted that a more 
equitable approach is needed in Maryland, and that the suggested "many 
factors" analysis provides the best alternative. Concededly, limited 
shareholder liability should be maintained whenever possible to en-
courage capital growth and investment, but not to the point that such 
maintenance causes a blatent disregard for basic principles of justice and 
fairness. Only after the Maryland courts make an honest attempt to bal-
ance these policies will equity be achieved in situations involving piercing 
the corporate veil. 
Denise L. Speer 
168. Id. 
